## \*\*Neg Solvency Updates\*\*

### France Says No

#### France is against “humiliating Russia”, they’ll hesitate on anything too harsh

John Haltiwanger, 7-18-2022, "Former NATO chief rips into Macron for his 'disastrous' suggestion Putin shouldn't be humiliated in Ukraine," Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/former-nato-chief-rips-into-macron-over-approach-to-ukraine-putin-2022-7, accessed 7-20-2022//cpd

Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who was secretary-general of NATO from 2009 to 2014, did not pull any punches in his assessment of French President Emmanuel Macron's approach to the Ukraine war and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

In a new interview with the Atlantic, Rasmussen was especially critical of Macron's "disastrous" suggestion that the West should avoid humiliating Putin in Ukraine to keep the door open for a diplomatic resolution to the conflict, while excoriating France in terms of the military aid its provided to Kyiv in comparison to other Western powers. He also took aim at Macron's "unsuccessful" efforts at "telephone diplomacy with Putin."

Rasmussen, who is also a former prime minister of Denmark, said, "The UK has been an outstanding partner for Ukraine. Next to the US, the UK has been a driving force in helping Ukraine. This should be seen as a contrast to the efforts of another big European country, namely France — partly because of President Emmanuel Macron making those very strange statements about a need to avoid humiliating Putin and because of his telephone diplomacy with Putin: unsuccessful, I would say."

"If you assess the weapons deliveries from different countries to Ukraine, France has delivered almost nothing. The scale of French deliveries is equivalent to what Denmark has offered—valued at $160 million, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy," Rasmussen added. "In comparison, Britain has been outstanding."

Speaking on his opposition to giving Putin what Macron described as an "exit ramp," the former NATO chief said that the West "reacted too mildly and we sent the wrong message" to the Russian leader following Russia's invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014.

"He calculated that he could, almost without any cost, grab land from his neighbors," Rasmussen said of Putin, adding, "That is why Macron's statement is so disastrous. It suggests that we are approaching a new world order where it's not the rule of law that matters but the rule of the strongest. If Putin can get away with taking land from Ukraine, that's horrendous—because what next?"

Rasmussen warned that if Putin is able to get what he wants in Ukraine then it would send a "very bad signal" to China regarding Taiwan.

"The Chinese are following the developments in Ukraine very closely because if Putin can get away with taking Crimea, and maybe the Donbas, and that is settled in a peace deal, then China might interpret that as an invitation to take Taiwan by force," he said.

This is why Putin shouldn't be offered an exit ramp in the war, Rasmussen said, and should instead be told that if he wants "to get out of this mess, get out of Ukraine."

During an interview with French media in June, Macron said, "We must not humiliate Russia so that the day when the fighting stops we can build an exit ramp through diplomatic means."

### Germany Says No

#### Russian deterrence fails- Germany’s tendency to appease Russia wrecks NATO consensus or stalls negotiations

Peter **Rough**, 6-16-20**22**, "Germany’s New Resolve on Russia Is Already Flagging," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/16/germany-scholz-zeitenwende-russia-ukraine-war-defense-security-bundeswehr-nato-military/, accessed 7-20-2022//cpd

When German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stood before his country’s parliament in the first days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and announced a Zeitenwende—or turn of an era—in German foreign policy, his country was agog. So were Germany watchers around the world. The country, Scholz announced, would immediately start rebuilding its military, supplying Ukraine with weapons, and eliminating its energy dependence on Russia. In one speech, he overturned not only decades of Russia policy but also German restraint and pacifism in security and defense. Scholz had taken the initiative without consulting anyone other than his finance minister, flooring even senior members of his own Social Democratic Party, which has a long record advocating for appeasing Russia. For a brief moment, a dramatic shift seemed in the offing.

Alas, the shift has not come to pass. In Berlin last week, German officials and observers described the speech to me as a moment in time rather than a shift in course. In a way, this is unsurprising. A former mayor of Hamburg, Scholz led his party to victory in last year’s election by leaning into the Hanseatic reputation for quiet competence, prudence, and composure. In other words, he sold himself as another version of his predecessor, Angela Merkel, who was known for her understated style and technocratic mastery. Lacking experience in geopolitics, Scholz promised little new in foreign policy.

His skills served Scholz well in the campaign, but they have proved a liability during a major European war. As a former finance minister, Scholz’s initial reflex after learning of the Russian invasion was to flood the zone with money, including a 100 billion euro ($108 billion) fund to bolster Germany’s armed forces. As a Social Democrat, his inclination since his uncharacteristically bold speech has been to try to manage, rather than confront, Russia. In effect, Scholz has attempted to substitute spending for leadership. The implications for Ukraine are dire: Russian President Vladimir Putin may not have won the war, but he may yet win the peace—especially if Scholz teams up with French President Emmanuel Macron, who has been pushing for an end to the war at terms favorable enough to Putin that he is spared any “humiliation.” To that end, Scholz and Macron will travel to Kyiv this week with Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi and Romanian President Klaus Iohannis.

Putin has long viewed Germany as ripe for exploitation. For far too long, the German political class prided itself for its supposedly patient, even-keeled approach toward Moscow that rose above what it saw as the unrefined fears and passions of its Eastern European allies. Over the years, Berlin forged a number of agreements, formulas, and formats it believed would appease and satiate Putin. Unable to imagine a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Germany either opposed deterrence as a hurdle for dialogue or ignored the balance of power altogether.

This posture—lukewarm support for Ukraine, eagerness to strike a deal with Putin, the hope to get back to business as usual—will set Europe back by years.

To be sure, Russia’s invasion has rattled German society. The German press has described it as a “9/11 moment,” with polls suggesting a significant shift in public attitudes. For example, 52 percent of Germans now support the continued basing of U.S. nuclear weapons in Germany, up from only 14 percent last year.

When key voices such as German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, a member of the Greens, and the parliamentarian Norbert Röttgen of the opposition Christian Democrats offer robust defenses of Ukraine, they are channeling a significant cross-section of society. Many Germans do not believe that a sustainable peace in Europe is possible without a serious setback for Russia and its imperialist aims.

Yet little of this finds expression in German policy, as set by Scholz. To be sure, he has not gone as far as Macron, who has suggested Ukraine surrender territory and warned the West against “humiliating” Putin. But the German reflex to answer Putin’s escalation by building diplomatic offramps is already reasserting itself. Scholz has initiated several calls with Putin, most recently a joint call with Macron that lasted 80 minutes and prioritized a cease-fire and solving the global commodity crisis. He is also reportedly reversing an earlier promise to station extra troops in Lithuania as part of NATO deterrence of any Russian attack on the Baltic states. Putin almost certainly interprets such moves as expressions of flagging Western resolve. In the days after the Scholz-Macron call, for example, he doubled down on attacking Ukrainian grain facilities.

At the same time, German military assistance to Ukraine remains paltry. Berlin reportedly failed to meaningfully supply Ukraine with any weapons in April and May and has yet to deliver a single heavy weapon since the start of the war. Although a few major systems are expected to reach Ukraine later this summer, the real prize—an advanced anti-aircraft system—won’t deploy until this fall, at which point German intelligence assesses Russia may have already completed its conquest of the Donbas. The scuttlebutt in Berlin is that this is intentional: Scholz does not want footage of German equipment engaging Russian forces to be published. (That Russian weapons manufactured with German machine tools and software are killing Ukrainians doesn’t seem to be of much concern in Berlin.)

The push for diplomacy and neglect of hard power are endemic to German foreign policy, but in the case of Ukraine, there is an additional complication in play. Since the end of the Cold War, Berlin has treated Ukraine as a mere plank of its Russia policy. When former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, now deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, said in the days before the war that the West would stand down because it believes “Russia is more important than Ukraine,” he could easily have been describing Germany. It has become sport among the Berlin media to press Scholz and his defense minister, Christine Lambrecht, on their support for a Ukrainian victory, a goal that both refuse to endorse.

The fact that Berlin is awash in rumors of secret negotiations with Russia suggests Germany would prefer to disappoint Ukraine than humiliate Russia—whatever that may mean. For example, if Putin offers to lift the blockade of Odesa in return for sanctions relief or pause hostilities in recognition of a new line of contact, voices for accommodation will only grow.

The accommodationists are emboldened by an unlikely ally: the United States. Just like Scholz and Lambrecht, U.S. officials have lately shied away from endorsing a Ukrainian victory. In private with their German counterparts, senior Biden administration officials have gone a step further, stating explicitly that Washington is not aiming for victory, either. When the Biden administration embraces Germany, it is less a tactic to flatter Berlin into taking a stronger line and more a reflection of general agreement between the two governments.

This posture—lukewarm support for Ukraine, eagerness to strike a deal with Putin, the hope to get back to business as usual—will set Europe back by years, perhaps even decades. The initial goodwill bought by Germany for suspending the Nord Stream 2 pipeline from Russia is fleeting, especially if any deal over Ukraine includes sanctions relief and the return to full oil and gas deliveries. Any such deal is sure to kill any remaining solidarity and trust underpinning the European Union. Even if they are not outright destabilized by the war, Eastern European states such as Poland and the Baltics will, in the future, see an EU led by France and Germany less as a community of values and more as an economic arrangement held together by euros and cents. The war in Ukraine may have badly mauled the Russian military, but if Putin appears confident, it is because Scholz—along with Macron—may yet help him snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. If so, it will be even clearer that the Zeitenwende was no such thing.

#### Germany’s reluctance to punish Russia will stall any cooperation with NATO

Judy **Dempsey**, 1-24-20**22**, "Why Germany Is Undermining NATO Unity on Russia," Carnegie Europe, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/01/26/why-germany-is-undermining-nato-unity-on-russia-pub-86279, accessed 7-20-2022//cpd

As Russia continues its military buildup along Ukraine’s borders, NATO and the EU are trying to project a strong, united front on these extraordinary and dangerous developments. But Germany is undermining that unity, leaving the West weaker and more divided. Below, Strategic Europe editor-in-chief Judy Dempsey digs into what’s driving Germany’s actions on this latest crisis.

WHY IS GERMANY RELUCTANT TO FOLLOW NATO ALLIES ON UKRAINE?

Publicly, Berlin toes the NATO line on sending troops and equipment to the Baltic states and Romania in order to boost the alliance’s eastern flank. In practice, it does not want to send any defensive weapons to Ukraine. It blocked Estonia from sending such equipment, which had been made in Germany, and a UK aircraft carrying military equipment to Ukraine detoured around German airspace. The German political establishment believes such moves will destabilize Europe and make it more difficult to have a dialogue with Russia.

BUT ISN’T RUSSIA TRYING TO DESTABILIZE UKRAINE?

Germany doesn’t see it that way. There is a part of **the German establishment that sees Ukraine through the prism of Russia**. For historical reasons, this group views Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia as a cordon sanitaire between Europe and Russia. There’s a legacy of both centuries-old rivalry and cooperation between Russia and Germany. And there’s the immense historical guilt of Germany’s role in World War II. Ukraine and Belarus suffered horribly under Adolf Hitler’s occupation, but somehow, these facts don’t enter into the public discourse. The historical guilt is centered on Russia, and German politicians often refer to this legacy.

DON’T BELARUS, GEORGIA, AND UKRAINE ONE DAY WANT TO JOIN BOTH NATO AND THE EU?

Yes. Joining the EU is a long way off, but that is their goal. That is what drives the reformers when it comes to strengthening democracy, the rule of law, and an independent judiciary. That’s what scares Russia: truly independent, democratic countries on its border. And NATO is its red line. Putin does not want any Eastern European countries joining this Western security alliance. If they did, the United States would, from the security and military points of view, dominate not only Western Europe but also Eastern Europe. Russia would lose any leverage to influence events among its immediate western neighbors. NATO would defend these countries if they were threatened or attacked.

That is why Putin is threatening Ukraine and demanding a water-tight commitment from NATO that Ukraine will not join. He does not want Ukraine integrated into the Euro-Atlantic structures of NATO or the EU, nor does he want a secure and democratic Ukraine on his doorstep. The fear of contagion would be too big.

HOW ARE NATO ALLIES REACTING TO GERMANY’S RELUCTANCE?

With anger. The Baltic states and Central European countries believe Germany doesn’t understand their security concerns or Russia’s intentions. They believe the German political and business establishments are so close to Russia that they don’t want to upset those decades-long ties.

DOES GERMANY’S STANCE HAVE ANY SUPPORT?

Yes, from France, but for different reasons. President Emmanuel Macron wants a European, not a U.S-led, response to this crisis. He wants Europe to have its own security and defense policy that would create a kind of “strategic autonomy.” In Macron’s view, the global geostrategic context has changed so much that Europe has to develop its own instruments to defend itself and shape policy. But Germany has no strategic compass. Because of World War II, it is locked into a pacifist way of thinking. This explains why it is uncomfortable with Macron’s idea, as are the Baltic states, Poland, and other Central European countries.

WHY IS THAT?

The Ukraine crisis has made Central Europe even more pro-NATO and pro-American because of Germany’s closeness to Russia and Macron’s ambitions to have a militarily and strategically capable Europe. These countries will likely put a brake on any future EU integration, especially when it comes to security, defense, and foreign policy, where consensus would give way to simple majority voting under proposed reforms. They don’t trust France’s intentions, which they see as weakening Europe’s relationship with NATO. They don’t trust Berlin because it is seen as too pro-Russia. This is bad news for the EU.

### Turkey Says No

#### Turkey uses NATO negotiations as leverage- Finland and Sweden proves he will use the aff as a tradeoff for political gains and stall negotiations- IF they say yes.

Jonathan **Lemire**, 6-28-20**22**, "There’s a strongman holding NATO hostage. And it’s not Putin.," POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/28/nato-kremlin-turkey-00042756, accessed 7-20-2022//cpd

Erdogan has often been the problem child within the alliance.

Despite objections from Washington, Erdogan has purchased S-400 air systems from Russia, helped Iran evade some sanctions and is accused of letting Hamas and ISIS fighters safely transverse his nation’s territory. He stands for reelection next summer after two decades in power, during which he has strengthened his rule through constitutional changes, imprisoning many of his alleged critics and cracking down on the media. Some analysts believe he decided that strong-arming NATO would make for good domestic politics.

“Erdogan is NATO’s weakest link,” said Jonathan Schanzer, senior vice president at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “But Biden has quite a lot on his plate. Too much, in fact. Whatever Erdogan thinks he’s going to get, he may find that he will need to get in line. He might gain a concession, but at what cost? Turkey is the reason that several NATO states have explored an ejection mechanism, which NATO currently lacks.”

Erdogan had cozied up with Biden’s predecessor, Donald Trump, who declared in 2019 that he was a “big fan” of Turkey’s strongman leader even though Ankara had just purchased weapons systems from Russia over the howls of a bipartisan group of lawmakers. Many in Washington condemned Trump’s decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Syria, which led to a Turkish onslaught of the Kurds, who fought alongside Americans against Islamic State fighters — but whom Erdogan has deemed “terrorists.”

Erdogan and Biden met along the sidelines of the G-20 summit last fall in Rome but did not cross paths at the extraordinary NATO summit in Brussels this spring, soon after Russia’s invasion. Erdogan has raised concerns about Swedish support for Kurdish militias and appears intent on creating a precedent to prevent any NATO ally from backing the group.

“[Erdogan] is very good in converting what is good for Turkey into what is good for Erdogan,” said Soner Cagaptay, a Turkey expert with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “I believe that Erdogan is going to use this to boost his popularity before elections in Turkey.”

Many officials believe that Erdogan’s concern about the Kurdish militants is also a convenient fig leaf to disguise his real hopes — to get the Americans to approve a sale of F-16 fighter jets to Ankara.

“The argument is the ‘tell’ that the Turks are actually negotiating with Biden,” said Steven Cook of the Council on Foreign Relations. “President Erdogan calculates that NATO expansion is more important to Biden than congressional concerns about sending F-16s to Turkey.”

If Erdogan signs off on any deal, the agreement would, in many ways, underscore just how badly Putin’s invasion has backfired.

Among the Russian leader’s justifications for crossing into Ukraine was to prevent it, or any other Eastern European nation, from joining NATO, which was formed in the aftermath of World War II as a bulwark to aggression from the then-Soviet Union. The organization’s founding principle is known as Article Five: that if any one member is attacked, the rest of the alliance is obligated to come to its defense.

Putin wagered that, when faced with bonafide Russian violence and economic hardships stemming from the war, NATO would splinter and resist rushing to the aid of a non-member. But instead, the alliance has rallied together, with many of its members sending weapons and money to Kyiv’s defense.

Biden says NATO is focused on all directions and domains

And while Ukraine itself has wavered on the idea of joining NATO, Putin’s invasion has pushed other European nations, including Finland and Sweden, to do so.

“Putin has been counting on, from the beginning, that somehow NATO would — and the G-7 would splinter,” Biden said at the week’s first summit, the G-7, in Germany. “But we haven’t, and we’re not going to.”

#### Turkey is the weak link in NATO, but NATO’s consensus structure makes it just as important as the US

Michael Rubin 7-7-2022, “Russia Aims To Paralyze NATO Without A Single Shot”, https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/07/russia-aims-to-paralyze-nato-without-a-single-shot///cpd

Erdogan may be a cynic and Turkey may no longer be deserving of NATO membership, but there is little NATO can do for two reasons: First, there is no mechanism within NATO to expel a wayward member, and, second, the organization governs itself by consensus. There is no difference between the vote of the United States, with 330 million people, Turkey with 85 million, and North Macedonia with 1.8 million.

If Erdogan sympathizes more with Russia than the United States, and all evidence suggests he does, then he and Russian President Vladimir Putin gain more power having Turkey as part of NATO than separate from it because they can use Turkey’s membership to paralyze the alliance from within.

Putin, however, understands just how mercurial and egotistical Erdogan is. When Erdogan looks in the mirror, he sees Putin’s equal, but when Putin looks at Erdoǧan, he sees a Chihuahua. Simply put, Putin will never place Russia’s broader security aims in the power of a man he sees as little more than a yapping dog.

So what is Putin’s Plan B for NATO?

It is already unfolding in the Balkans. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Ivana Strander has carefully and repeatedly chronicled the Kremlin’s attempts to interfere domestically in various Balkan countries, including NATO members such as Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Croatia. The White House and State Department might compartmentalize their diplomacy, but Putin is taking a more holistic approach. Simply put, his strategy appears to shut down NATO action by the veto of its small members who his forces infiltrate long before it becomes necessary to confront the defense alliance on the battlefield.

The question for Washington and Brussels, then, is what is the American and European response? The tendency in both capitals to sigh with relief when a crisis passes serves NATO poorly when what really transpired with Turkey was a dry run to destroy NATO from within.

#### Turkey says no, they won’t risk their friendship with Russia OR they’ll demand something too risky in return

Simon A. **Waldman**, 6-30-20**22**, "Two-faced Turkey demands a terrible price for NATO expansion," Haaretz, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/turkey/2022-06-30/ty-article-opinion/.premium/two-faced-turkey-demands-a-terrible-price-for-nato-expansion/00000181-b40c-d445-afbd-bc1cf9960000, accessed 7-20-2022//cpd

Ankara figures that the Turkish she-wolf has no chance against the Russian bear in a head-to-head wrestling match. Instead, Ankara seeks both active engagement with Moscow on a bilateral level, but belligerency through proxies in their overlapping near abroad.

This is how that delicate, if not fragile, balancing act works. Turkey buys Russian S400 surface-to-air missiles and sends ministers to Moscow for strategic discussions, while seeking to advance trade relations. In 2019, before the COVID crisis hit, the volume of that trade stood at $23 billion and the two sides reiterated their goal of making this number reach $100 billion. Energy cooperation is strong with Gazprom having just signed a four-year gas deal with Turkey’s state energy company Botas in January this year, the latest advancement of the Turkstream project, the Russia to Turkey natural gas pipeline. Turkey is predicted to receive 1.5 million Russian tourists this year, including Putin’s oligarchs who can enjoy Turkey’s luxurious resorts without fear of sanction.

However, Turkey supported the Government of National Accord during the Second Libyan Civil war, despite Moscow having thrown its lot with its sworn enemy, General Haftar. Just before the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Turkey armed Azerbaijan to the teeth while Russia backed Armenia. In Syria, Russia continues to back the country’s president Bashar Assad while Turkey supports an umbrella collective of opposition groups.

Ankara’s jaundiced policy towards Russia continues during the Ukraine crisis. Turkey supplies the famed Bayraktar drones to Ukraine and limited Russia’s military use of the Bosphorus straits which connect the Black Sea with the Sea of Marmara and then onto the Mediterranean, in accordance with the 1936 Montreux Convention. However, Turkey also placates Moscow by refusing to close its airspace to Russia (unless flights are headed to Syria) or to impose sanctions, and instead has sought (with little success) to facilitate talks between the two sides.

So, now that Turkey has opened the path for NATO’s Nordic expansion, expect Ankara to make some sort of conciliatory gesture to Moscow in return. That is, unless the West performs a complete U-turn in its relations with Turkey – or, rather, a complete appeasement.

In getting Turkey to agree to drop its opposition to Sweden and Finland joining NATO, the three countries signed a trilateral memorandum, whereby Stockholm and Oslo pledged to drop arms embargoes on Turkey, curtails the activities of the PKK in their soil, examine Turkish extradition requests against suspected members of the PKK and the Gulen movement, and promise not to provide support to YPG/PYD in Syria.

In agreeing to these terms, it was not Turkey which made a U-turn but rather Sweden and Finland. This new trilateral memorandum is uncannily similar to the conditions Ankara set out for NATO expansion back in May. No wonder the slavish Turkish press has hailed this week’s deal as a sweeping victory.

Mr Erdogan will now expect Sweden and Finland to adhere to the spirit, and not just the (notably vague) letter, of the agreement. This means he will demand they back a future Turkish operation in Syria to combat the YPG, who happen to be the West’s main allies against Islamic State, support Ankara’s plans to expel and forcibly resettle over one million Syrian refugees in northern Syria, take concrete steps to extradite alleged members of the PKK and Gulen movement to face trial, unlikely to be fair, in Turkey, and keep schtum about Turkey’s poor human rights records and abuses of fundamental democratic freedoms.

### Squo Solves – Generic

#### Status Quo solves emerging tech- funding, DIANA, and strategic concept

John **Harper** 6-30-20**22**“New $1B NATO innovation will fund back wide range of emerging Tech”, FedScoop, https://www.fedscoop.com/new-1-billion-nato-innovation-fund-will-back-wide-range-of-emerging-technology///cpd

NATO leaders on Thursday officially launched a $1 billion innovation fund that will invest in companies working on a slew of dual-use technologies with great military potential.

Billed as the world’s first “multi-sovereign” venture capital fund involving 22 nations, it is intended to make long-term investments in startups and other entities developing emerging technologies that the alliance is interested in including artificial intelligence, autonomy, big-data processing, quantum-enabled technologies, biotechnology and human enhancement; novel materials; energy; propulsion and space.

“This fund is unique,” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said during a signing ceremony at a summit in Madrid where alliance leaders inked a letter of commitment pledging to support the initiative. “With a 15-year timeframe, the NATO Innovation Fund will help bring to life those nascent technologies that have the power to transform our security in the decades to come, strengthening the Alliance’s innovation ecosystem and bolstering the security of our one billion citizens.”

The summit was attended by President Biden, his alliance counterparts and other world leaders.

Together with the new Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), the fund will help the alliance “harness the best new technology for transatlantic security,” Stoltenberg said at a press conference Wednesday. The DIANA initiative will provide innovators access to facilities that they can tap into, including more than 60 test centers across Europe and North America.

DIANA “will support NATO’s efforts to boost interoperability and ensure that every Ally has access to cutting-edge technological solutions for military needs,” according to a White House fact sheet released Wednesday.

The United States will contribute to that initiative by facilitating access to U.S. test centers and other technology “accelerator sites” in the “extensive and diverse U.S. innovation sector,” according to the White House.

During the summit, NATO also unveiled a new Strategic Concept that emphasized the need to adopt emerging technologies to improve the alliance’s defense capabilities.

#### The US has already pledged tech assistance to NATO

Diego Laje, 6-29-2022, "U.S. To Increase Cyber Capabilities, Research and Funding with NATO," SIGNAL Magazine, https://www.afcea.org/content/us-increase-cyber-capabilities-research-and-funding-nato, accessed 7-21-2022//cpd

President Joe Biden announced an expansion of U.S. forces and cyber capabilities to Europe in support of NATO.

"NATO is strong, united, and the steps we're taking during this summit are going to further augment our collective strength," Biden said during the NATO summit in Madrid, Spain, on Wednesday.

A new cyber cooperation action plan is also expected from this summit, covering political, military and technical levels.

"Since February 2022, DoD deployed or extended over 20,000 additional forces to Europe in response to the Ukraine crisis, adding additional air, land, maritime, cyber and space capabilities, bringing our current total to more than 100,000 service members across Europe," said the department in a release.

The organization will launch the NATO Innovation Fund. “It will invest 1 billion euros in start-ups and funds developing dual-use emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence,” said Jens Stoltenberg, NATO’s secretary general.

This fund will be a part of NATO’s Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic, or DIANA, Stoltenberg said in a press conference.

“Leaders will offer pledges to help stand up a new Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic,” the White House said in a release, and specified that the U.S. will also facilitate access to test centers and accelerator sites to NATO allies.

In terms of other combat resources, the increases will bring from four to six the number of U.S. destroyers at the Rota Naval Base, in Spain. The Army will establish a permanent headquarters for the U.S. 5th Army Corps in Poland and a rotational brigade combat team in Romania.

"In Poland, we're going to establish a permanent headquarters of the U.S. 5th Army Corps and strengthen NATO interoperability across the entire eastern flank," Biden told journalists.

Also, the United Kingdom will receive two additional F-35 squadrons that will be stationed at RAF Lakenheath.

Special operations forces will also be deployed in the Baltic republics, as well as 625 military personnel for air defense, logistics and engineering in Germany, as well as 65 troops to increase air defense capabilities in Italy.

These decisions "are reflective of the United States government's recognition that the security environment has changed and, in particular, in the NATO that the Eastern countries are facing a heightened threat from a Russian leadership that has shown itself willing and capable of launching military attacks on bordering countries," said Celeste A. Wallander, the Defense Department's assistant secretary for international security affairs.

### Bronze Night Neg – Solvency Answers

#### Building stacks through cooperating with NATO allows for open sourcing that provides better public benefits.

**New America**, **ND**, "The Digital Government Mapping Project," https://www.newamerica.org/digital-impact-governance-initiative/reports/digital-government-mapping-project/10-principles-for-building-a-digital-government-stack/

1. Modularity

While a handful of countries have built impressive, tightly integrated digital stacks, these outliers are the exception rather than the rule. Both technically and politically, it is usually easier and less expensive to create smaller solutions that can be easily reconfigured and optimized as circumstances change. Just like a set of Legos, modular platforms can be reassembled to address needs and opportunities that may not have been anticipated when they were first created. UK Notify demonstrates these benefits. After the solution was initially deployed in the UK, it was adapted to meet new challenges by the Australian Digital Transformation Agency, the U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs, and the Canadian Digital Service. Along the way, the system developed new capabilities. For example, Canadian engineers added French language support to the original tool. Doing so not only fulfilled a national mandate to make the software available in French and English, but also provided new functionality that the UK and French-speaking communities might be able to draw on in the future. The flexibility of modular solutions is a huge advantage at a time when technology and public needs are both evolving rapidly.

2. Open Source

Most of the work performed by governments is similar regardless of whether it is in New York, New Delhi, or Freetown. Almost all governments have to provide public benefits and services, collect taxes, maintain registries, and carry out a pretty well-defined set of other responsibilities that could be streamlined using technology. As the example above illustrates, governments are slowly waking up to the opportunity to develop and share open source solutions to power the public sector rather than building duplicative solutions of varying quality. Along with modular design, **open source development can help governments cooperate to develop best-in-class solutions, adapt them to meet their own needs, and quickly scale them across borders to benefit other communities at minimal extra cost.** One of the benefits of open source development is that it allows civil society **to examine the systems governments implement and point out design flaws, security risks, and threats to privacy and civil rights**. A contact tracing app deployed in India was found to have numerous security bugs and led public authorities to open source the code for additional review by the global security community. Since then, hundreds of security flaws have been identified and fixed thanks to the power of crowdsourced engineering talent made possible by open source. DIGI’s Building and Reusing Open Source Tools in Government report provides a guide for how open source solutions can foster innovation in the public sector.

#### The aff’s digital transformation into governable stacks will not succeed without engaging with the state to draw political will and enact new policies for technology.

**Wilson 21** [Kate Wilson, 2021, "25. Digital ecosystems components every country needs," Digital Impact Alliance, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/ee3cfcd9-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/ee3cfcd9-en]

Digital transformations are multifaceted. To help countries, development actors and other stakeholders should meet needs and priorities that are right for each specific context. Patterns across some of the countries that have led the way in digital transformation, and measurements of national digital transformations1 themselves, suggest **that** at least five factors are critical, though not all may be initially present. The Digital Impact Alliance (DIAL) has developed a simple 5 Ps framework (Box 25.1). Considering these interrelated areas – each important to building the right digital system – can help actors identify and co-ordinate around manageable problem sets. First is political will from national leadership to achieve a digital economy and (when relevant) an international development community to support such a digital transformation. The second factor is citizen-responsive policies that ensure that the system being built is designed with citizen protection in mind. The third and fourth – supply and demand – factors are commercially attractive pricing and procurement models and the availability of scalable products that can seamlessly connect. Finally, a fifth factor is the depth of digital literacy and capacity among all people, including in development agencies, to implement the policies, manage both the procurements and products, and ultimately build sustainable solutions that can be improved over time. Figure 25.1 elaborates the relationships among these factors, illustrating the critical role played by political will in driving change across the entire process.

Box 25.1. The 5 Ps: A framework to design, implement and assess digital transformation

In analysis by the Digital Impact Alliance and others of digital transformations undertaken by countries that have led the way in this multifaceted process, five main success factors emerge and are consistently included in available measurements of digital transformation globally (DIAL, 2018[2]; DIAL, 2021[3]). The 5 Ps framework can help development agencies, national governments, the private sector and other civil society actors better understand the challenge in each context and where they might fit in, and in this way find more easily manageable and co-ordinated ways forward.

Political will: Politics can influence a country’s ability to undertake and sustain digital transformation, and the extent to which political actors prioritise the process will shape the conception, design, use and purpose of a system.

Policy: Political will is closely related to policy at national and global levels. The right policy helps build trust in digital systems by regulating the use of technology, protecting citizen data, minimising risks and enabling opportunities.

Pricing and procurement: Innovative financing and procurement approaches can derisk markets to incentivise new entrants to supply digital technology products and accelerate digital transformation.

Product: The right products that are scalable, available and able to seamlessly connect are the technology building blocks of successful systems.

People: Both countries and the development partners supporting their digital transformations need people with the right skills in areas that enable digital services.

#### Lack of change in governmental policies leads to cooption of their stacks – personal data leaks, abuse of personal data, lack of interoperability, and more.

**Wilson 21** [Kate Wilson, 2021, "25. Digital ecosystems components every country needs," Digital Impact Alliance, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/ee3cfcd9-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/ee3cfcd9-en]

Given the many factors that make up digital transformation, political will for inclusive, people-centred approaches at national and global levels is crucial. Without it, solutions risk harming rather than helping well-being, though, for instance, personal data leaks, lack of interoperability, redundant systems and abuse of personal data in government hands. As the world addresses the multiple challenges of climate change, conflict and fragility, and the impact of COVID-19, digital and data systems can be leveraged to maximise scarce resources and bolster preparedness for future crises, but only if the harmful pitfalls can be avoided. This is the role of policy.

Policy should be transparent, inspire trust and minimise potential harms of technology

Responsible, inclusive and effective national digital transformation requires a whole-of-society approach to developing the enabling policy environment (DIAL, 2020[1]). Such approaches incorporate the values of inclusion, obliging governments to create meaningful mechanisms for societal actors to participate and engage in priority setting, stakeholder selection, implementation strategy and holding their governments accountable. Building civic ownership of digital transformation, in turn, builds citizens’ trust in their government’s use of digital tools and data. An example of this approach is Estonia (see Chapter 12), which has established mutual transparency as a hallmark of its digital system, with citizen input and consent as key design principles.5 National digital policy frameworks cover issues including data protection and privacy, cybercrime and cybersecurity, intellectual property rights, payments and trade regulations, digital social protection, and emerging tech and innovation regulations. These policies acknowledge and help **guard against more insidious economic and social impacts of digital service provision such as the use of artificial intelligence to target or limit financial assistance or healthcare offerings to citizens**. Estonia’s inclusive approach offers a useful model for other countries to consider when designing national digital transformations.

### SSA Neg – TCBMS Fail

#### TCBMs fail---circumvention and abuse

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Moreover, TCBMs are merely a means for achieving space security but their effectiveness highly depends upon their precise contents, pertinent scope, uniform and effective implementation, objective compliance monitoring and verification, and the presence of efficient dispute settlement mechanisms. Compliance with non-binding undertakings under TCBMs cannot be fully expected or guaranteed. It is well-known that neither the information sharing regime under the non-binding 2002 Hague Code of Conduct for Ballistic Missiles nor the registration of space objects under the binding 1969 Registration Convention are fully respected by the subscribing States. We should also be aware that there is always a possibility of an abuse of TCBMs, as for example there have been instances when ‘violations’ of the Missile Technology Control Regime—a form of TCBM—had been alleged against some States that were not subscribers to the Regime. Irrespective of the good intentions and the abundance of possible means for preventing an arms race in outer space, the lack of political will, primarily on the part of major space-faring nations, has so far constrained any serious progress in achieving space security. Only time will tell if the recent initiatives being undertaken by the international community on TCBMs in outer space will bear any fruit.

#### TCBMs actively justify dangerous activities which increases the risk of miscalc

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In spite of their popularity, such agreements do not always reduce tensions. Hot lines between China and other nations, perhaps the most basic form of a confidence-building measure, have a particularly poor record. In addition to its dedicated line with the former Soviet Union, China has at one time or another established hot lines with Japan, the United States, Vietnam, and South Korea. However, in subsequent crises with those countries, the phone lines were reportedly dead. After North Korea carried out a nuclear test earlier this year, South Korean President Park Geun-hye reportedly tried to reach Chinese President Xi Jinping on the countries’ bilateral hot line for an emergency consultation. Xi apparently declined to answer. In some of the cases, unrelated political disputes led to the complete termination of the hot line. For example, China and Japan had agreed in May 2010 to establish a hot line for managing crises. However, after a September 2010 collision involving a Chinese fishing boat and Japanese coast guard vessels, China, reportedly angered by the Japanese decision to detain the Chinese captain, terminated the hot line. Some Western experts have raised questions about whether China would adhere to confidence-building agreements, and Japanese security analysts have reportedly expressed concerns that while Beijing has shown some willingness to engage with Washington on confidence-building measures, it may be less cooperative with neighboring countries. On top of failing to resolve tensions, the sloppy implementation of such procedures can make bad situations worse. As the scholar Marie-France Desjardins has written, poorly negotiated and implemented confidence-building measures pose several unintended risks, such as inadvertently justifying dangerous or unwanted activities. One Western observer questioned the value of having the United States and the Soviet Union notify each other of large-scale military maneuvers, reportedly saying, “If a suspected adversary tells you he has a gun, even shows it to you, that does not necessarily lessen your apprehension, much less your mistrust of his motives for brandishing the weapon.” The development of bilateral confidence-building measures and the subsequent warming of relations between state parties may spark concern among states that are not party to the agreement. And actual or perceived noncompliance can further poison relations between parties, hobbling future efforts at cooperation. In the South China Sea and elsewhere, China, the United States, and other parties to confidence-building measures must ensure that they follow through on agreements with effective implementation. Noncompliance can occur for several reasons. States may have differing interpretations of their agreements. One of the advantages of confidence-building measures, especially first-generation ones, is that they typically require relatively little political or operational commitment from the parties. Indeed, that’s what makes confidence-building measures attractive as initial steps between distrustful states. The 2014 agreements between China and the United States on military notifications and codes of conduct are distinctive in that compliance with them is both voluntary and confidential. Compliance is not mandatory, and information that is reported, pursuant to the agreement, cannot be shared with other parties. But this tendency toward fewer requirements can make confidence-building agreements overly vague and lead to misunderstandings or large loopholes. For example, Washington and Beijing currently disagree over whether the 2014 agreement applies to encounters in all waters or only those that both recognize as international. Then there is the issue of political will. An insufficient amount can cause confidence-building measures to fall by the wayside. Upon concluding an agreement, leaders often delegate their subordinates with the onerous task of implementing the agreement. Such decentralization may lead to clashes between domestic actors and a state government that struggles to build cohesive policies. Despite Xi’s efforts to consolidate his power, his policy on the South China Sea is fragmented by domestic interest groups such as the State Oceanic Administration, commercial fishing operations, and the competing interests of local governments. These actors often drive Chinese policy in contradictory directions. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a key coordinator for China’s policy in the South China Sea and has reportedly advocated a less confrontational approach. However, its efforts to form a unified and consistent policy front have been hampered by a lack of political authority, given that other bureaucratic actors, such as the People’s Liberation Army or provincial governors, enjoy political standing equal to or above that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. States may also lack the institutional capacity to implement the agreements. Few countries can match the depth and quality of the U.S. national security apparatus. Even China has struggled to muster comparable bureaucratic might. A former director-general of China’s Department of Arms Control in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was reported lamenting that his office had “less than 30 staff members, most of whom are very young and have little practical experience in arms control.”

### SSA Neg – Debris Tracking Fails

#### More accurate tracking won’t solve the space debris problem

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When the location of space debris is known, it is possible for a maneuverable satellite to avoid collisions. Furthermore, satellite operators will avoid placing their satellites into orbits of known debris. The large debris are most dangerous; thus, the ability to [\*482] track them is very important. Nevertheless, all the hundreds of thousands of smaller debris are also threatening. Tracking is an important tool for avoiding collisions in outer space, but it does not solve the space debris problem. The U.S. Air Force Space Surveillance Network (SSN) tracks 23,000 debris larger than ten centimeters in LEO and larger than thirty centimeters in GEO. 34Link to the text of the note The new Air Force Space Fence system will have ten times better tracking capability beginning in 2018. 35Link to the text of the note Only a small percentage of objects tracked are operational and navigable. Almost all the debris are unable to navigate and thus not able to change course to avoid collision.

#### There’s too much data for it to be actionable

Daniel L. Oltrogge & Salvatore Alfano 19. Corresponding authors, Center for Space Standards Innovation, May 21, 2019, “The technical challenges of better Space Situational Awareness and Space Traffic Management”, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2468896719300333#

4. Spacecraft operator SSA challenges

Many of today's LEO and GEO operators are already challenged to address all possible conjunctions against the 4% of currently tracked space objects larger than 1 cm, with little or no “surge capacity” (propellant and staffing resources) to address the other 96%. If operators were to have a truly comprehensive set of conjunctions against all objects larger than 1 cm, they would likely be continuously conducting avoidance maneuvers at the risk of running out of fuel. Inconsistencies in operator ephemerides have also been shown to preclude achieving SSA that can support assessments of collision probabilities higher than 1 × 10−4(a common collision probability threshold for commercial operations). Further, commercial operators can be constrained by their orbit determination programs, which often prevent the extraction of covariance data and planned maneuvers to support collision probability assessment. Spacecraft operators in all regimes often struggle to determine which conjunctions are “too close.” As shown inFig. 1, spacecraft op-erators frequently face multiple levels of risk. Operators with spacecraftoperating in a low-risk orbital regime can implement ultra-conservativecollision avoidance strategies at little fuel or operations cost. Operatorswith spacecraft operating in high-risk regimes must be as realistic andlean in their collision avoidance strategies as possible to avoid depletingtheir fuel budget and overtaxing theirflight dynamics teams. Unfortunately, while many collision avoidance maneuver Go/No-Go criteria exist, operators are generally unable to obtain the metrics and data types necessary to populate the criteria that suit them best. Additionally, the algorithms used to populate these criteria sometimes contain invalid assumptions such as using linearized collision probability and spherical object shape approximations when more sophisticated formulations are required.

### Bronze Night 2AC – Stacktivism

#### Stacktivism improves the theory of The Stack. By integrating social dimensions, we intervene on the level of the political.

**Lovink 20** – Geert Lovink is the founding director of the Institute of Network Cultures, whose goals are to explore, document and feed the potential for socio-economical change of the new media field through events, publications and open dialogue (Geert, 2020-11-09, “Principles of Stacktivism”, tripleC)

Benjamin Bratton also invites us to think tech in relation to geo-politics and location. At the same time The Stack can be seen as method, a mechanism. However, the book is consciously vague about how material infrastructure and ideology relate. In the light of Trump, Putin and Xi Jinping, Bratton’s global engineer seems a tragic, retrograde figure. At best The Stack works well as a multi-disciplinary guideline of past globalist techno-social practices that, ironically, have become outdated since 2016, the year of its publication and the year of Brexit and Trump. For all its ambition to delineate the geo-political contours of techno-operations supposedly occurring on a planetary scale, the book settles with an oddly depoliticised aesthetic imaginary. How can we free up The Stack from its current confinements and turn into an improvised dance? Let’s define a stacktivism, an active and reflective reading of stackson-the-move, that is not afraid of the subject (formerly known as user) and involves action, committed by confused, selfish, messy players. With this I mean grassroots interventions that do not take the current (Internet or IT infrastructure) stack as a given and turn the Will to Totality of the engineering class and their financial backers against itself. In comparison with the hacktivism and (tactical) media activism, stacktivism is indeed Hegelian in scope (Understanding Totality). It is confronting “das Ganze” and can be considered counter regressive as it takes into account the real-existing totality of today’s interrelated tech-architectures as opposed to the shrinking paranoid world of the online self that is in constant danger of collapse under the weight of its own selfimage, surveillance, precarity and depression. Niels ten Oever, Amsterdam-based Internet governance researcher and activist emphasises the importance of linking contexts and levels: “The stack never was and never will be. The stack always was an abstraction, a story that was told to keep people working in an isolated manner, ensuring engineers stuck to their own layer. As long as you worked within your own parameters and delivered what the layer above and below you expected of you, you would not get into trouble. Stacktivism, on the other hand, works across the stack: it is a cross-stack collaboration, an attempt to realign and redesign the interfaces. Looking for interconnections and associations that cannot be drawn from above, that defy standardization. Interconnections that escape abstractions and stereotypes. They are established through dynamic and unpredictable handshakes: questions, answers, and re(-)cognition” 13.

Stacktivism is ambivalent and struggles with totality, the global scale and the planetary whatever. Think big, but act in small steps, that’s the motto. We Are Infrastructure. Stacktivism fights against the comfort of ignorance and tries hard to overcome the designed lure to drift off, hovering above it all in a subconscious fashion. While defining what stackitivism could become, it is good to keep mind that we’re free to use Bratton’s The Stack as a theory toolbox and not interpret it as a hermetic belief system. Designs can intermingle. In line with Bratton, stackivism claims to understand and oversee all levels, from the politics of code, algorithms and AI to the behavioural science manipulation of moods, interface design choices and is alert to 5G electronic smog, phishing emails, fake news and the other sleazy suggestions of your “friends”. How about your bot sensibility? This hyperawareness comes at a high price. Not everyone is a stacktivist. Traditionally, direct action has been put in opposition to the talk fest. When we act, we stop talking and start doing. In the context of hacktivism this means that we no longer consume but start to code in order to be able to hack into computer systems in order to make real, tangible changes in society. Like Robin Hood, let’s define what stackivism-for-good could look like. How do we build rhizomatic links between global governance, protocol design, the ethics-without-consequences industry, code writing and investigative hacking? Who will be in charge of subversive foresight? Can we dream aloud together? How can delegate trust to our think tanks that work in the public interest? Stacktivism is a sovereign attitude in that it is not begging for a correct form of representation and could be considered post-democratic and post-identity, yet remains always all-too-human. Inside Douglas Rushkoff’s Team Human stacktivists take up the task of creating missing links: they are the meme sharers, idea connectors, intercultural fellow travellers, poly-disciplinary networkers. The social creation of new protocols remains an act of common decision. We are fighting at the conceptual forefront of tech. Nobody needs to give us permission. Unlike the tactical media interventions of the 1990s, stacktivism is – by definition– abstract and conceptual in nature, knowing that code is power and power is code. How to dismantle invisible power? Do we fight abstractions with abstractions, design with counter-designs? According to Internet and civil society researcher Corinne Cath we could see stacktivism as a “playful human evolution of Bratton’s concept of The Stack. It critiques its modular conception of world into discrete layers. To remedy this flattening, it calls for the inclusion of the inherent messiness of the Internet: the entangled basement wires, packets lost in translation, rugged governance cultures and the idiosyncratic usages of the humans who rely on it to function flawlessly” 14. Francesca Musiani (CNRS, Paris) found the lessons of decentralisation telling: “Decentralization often becomes a technical, political, economic and social aim in and of itself, reaching outside the ‘hacker’ circles of the early p2p systems. However, this has had side effects. Decentralization has become an objective in and of itself, with little understanding of intent or assessment of actual effects. I love Phil Agre's 2003 observation in this respect when he said: ‘Architecture is politics, but should not be understood as a substitute for politics’. Decentralized protocols are too readily assumed, because of their technical qualities, to bring about decentralized political, social and economic outcomes. A more fine-tuned appreciation of the social dimensions of the stack is likely to improve things in this regard” 15.

#### Our stacktivism is distinct from “the Stack” that the neg critiques – we create a digital commons that integrates society into our activism.

**Lovink 20** – Geert Lovink is the founding director of the Institute of Network Cultures, whose goals are to explore, document and feed the potential for socio-economical change of the new media field through events, publications and open dialogue (Geert, 2020-11-09, “Principles of Stacktivism”, tripleC)

Media historicism (aka archaeology) has so far failed to develop critical concepts to understand the current situation, also known as platform capitalism. There is more to the Internet than the politics of the senses. Notation systems and perception are so 20th century. What matters now is who owns the Internet in terms of data centres, cables and PR; and this is first and foremost a question of material analysis. A comparison with the Roman road system, as described in Innis’s Empire and Communications is more relevant here16. Let’s, for instance, investigate the relation between the modernist stack and the fuzzy post-modern cloud buzzword. How does Bratton’s design relate to recent proposals by stacktivists Francesca Bria and Evgeny Morozov for a European move towards “data sovereignty”? It’s too easy to unmask Bratton as a Californian techno-solutionist. How much is gained by planting this (now effectively empty) label on him? To determine, to think technologically remains an utmost urgency and it is precisely the “stacking” of issues, factors and contexts that will bring us further into the constitutive force of technical systems. The spectacle of clashing characters should not distract us (in fact, the silo phantom, the silence and separation is, oddly, our main problem, in this hyperconnected world). How does self-determination, for instance on a local level, relate to a visible decline in the consensus about the necessity to have global standards and global infrastructures? Is a fear of the Internet’s Balkaniation justified? Right now, open architecture is the one principle that is in most danger. Open standards and protectionism do not go together. What would it mean if we gave up the planetary level and narrowed our collective imaginary to the geo-politics of competing regional empires? In a regulatory wave, platforms can be forced to fork, and, as a result of this, other layers of The Stack can be dragged with them. Many apps are already implicitly regional. Take the AngloSaxon bias of Google Books and contrast this to the (Siberian) multipolar Libgen library. The liberal consensus of some kind of harmonious multi-stakeholder alliance between “global civil society” and tech giants of “global governance as running code” has long lost any credibility. We’re not only talking here about China’s Great Firewall but also latest efforts in Russia, Turkey and Iran (not to mention USA’s exceptionalism, which was one of the many causes of this development). Does the one stack exist or should we rather speak of The Stacks, a rainbow of a thousand stacks, such as Tiziana Terranova’s “red stack”17, the ancient blue stack of IBM and the green stack proposal that wants to tackle the massive energy use of the blockchain and data centres, including our own devices. And how about the European stack? In the aftermath of Snowden, the slogan “The Internet is Broken” started circulating, followed by Tim Berners Lee’s proposals for an alternative architecture of the web, following the Cambridge Analytica/Facebook scandals of 2018/19.

What Bratton’s definition of The Stack lacks is the society layer. We can only guess that his traditional US “globalist” upbringing is the cause of this mishap. A Thatcherite neo-liberal position perhaps lurks within his framework. Or should we rather think of an anarchist disgust with the state? The enlightened digital artist-engineer as Jesuit class? There is, for sure, more to say about this. Infrastructure does not equal society. A contemporary techno-Maoist slogan could be: There is no society, only infrastructure. There is no place either for the user as a civilian actor. What do we draw from this? As long as key layers are missing in such analyses, we can’t really draw new relations between them. After all, nothing only connects with nothing. This is why some in the context of art and hacktivism have proposed redesigning Bratton’s scheme as a “public stack”18. We need to define new forms of collective action that some call the commons that is defined by the ability to act together. The design question here is what comes next after the model of social networks, which has been so compromised and overshadowed by the social media monopolies. This is a digital commons in which collective forms of money is included, a redistribution of wealth that has been produced together and should never again be allowed to be expropriated. We need to collectivise our knowledge and learn from the mistakes that were made in projects such as Wikipedia and Creative Commons, but also of the self-centric notion of free software as promoted by Richard Stallman, who could only think in terms of individual freedom of the singleuser-as-programmer – until his 2019 downfall. What Bratton’s static metaphysical view in particular lacks is the role of actors (and their interests, ideologies). Instead of trashing the stack, the proposition here is to make the model more dynamic (or dialectical) by introducing stackivism. Let’s define stacktivism as a form of Internet activism that no longer bothers with the distractive noise on social media channels and dares to dig deeper in order to make a real difference. Instead of talking only about upload filters, fake news or the deployment of cheap online moderation armies, we are working on a next Internet. The charm of protocoldriven direct action or stacktivism is that it goes both up (from network to platform to stack) and down (protocols, data centres, cables), at the same time. The Internet is more than social media, more than you and your app. This may sound like a simple, self-evident slogan but the integral practice-based vision of stacktivism is a promising one, beyond techno-solutionism and it critics, the liberal-tech engineering status quo procedures, the discontent offline romanticism, liberal privacy concerns, legalistic NGO approaches and the after-the-fact Academic Truth that confines itself to the closed monads of peer-review journals.